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One who comes this far down in the alphabetical list expects 
that most-perhaps all-of the interesting things will already have 
been said. For example, it seems to me clear-and more than one 
of the other speakers has already said-that the posing of the topic 
is replete with false oppositions. The primary one, of course, is the 
distinction between hard law and mushy law, that is, between real 
law and constitutional law. Another version of that opposition 
counterposes private law and public law; a third opposes the rule-
like approach of real law with the standard-like approach of consti-
tutional law. 
I suppose the first and most obvious thing to say is that these 
oppositions are plainly false. Constitutional law is neither harder 
nor more mushy, neither less rule-like or more standard-like, than 
any other area of law. Consider for example the obviously rule-like 
structure of the contemporary constitutional law of libel; there's a 
whole set of categories each with its own regulatory rule. But per-
haps libel is an unfair example, because it is too closely derivative of 
the private law of libel. So consider instead the overall structure of 
the first amendment, which, as Fred Schauer has acutely argued, 
increasingly resembles something like the Uniform Commercial 
Code's structure. Or, finally, consider the often derided structure of 
equal protection law, which as developed by the Supreme Court is 
reasonably rule-like. These examples may be misleading, though, to 
the extent that they suggest that constitutional law is indeed like 
real law in being hard-edged and rule-like. So, one ought to intro-
duce all those areas of real law-negligence, the duty of fair dealing, 
unconscionability-that are pervasively mushy and standard-like. 
And, I should add, the coexistence of rules and standards is inevita-
ble. We can start with a rule-like doctrine-say Miranda-which, 
as is true of all rules, is over- and under-inclusive in terms of its 
purposes. That generates tension as soon as cases arise where the 
Miranda rule applies but its purposes do not, or when cases arise 
outside the scope of the rules where its purposes would be served by 
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applying them. The result will be the production of a series of ex-
ceptions and subrules, which eventually becomes rationalized in 
terms of some standard that balances the interests overall. 
In setting law off against justice-as in the criticism of the per-
fect Constitution and the like-the opposition between constitu-
tional law and private law is also false. Here the answer seems to 
me to come from looking at the work of one of the most prominent 
perfectionists around, Ronald Dworkin. I assume, and Dworkin's 
occasional essays suggest, that an important motivating factor in 
Dworkin's work is to justify a certain approach to constitutional 
law. Yet, Law's Empire, which all the reviewers describe as Dwor-
kin's first sustained and connected argument about jurisprudence, 
takes as its primary examples problems in private law; for example, 
his criticism of patchwork legislation lacking integrity takes off 
from an example of arbitrariness in products liability law. So, it 
would seem, if there is perfectionism around, if some people think 
that there ought be no distinction between law and justice, those 
concerns are just as important in discussions of real, nonconstitu-
tionallaw as they are in discussions of mushy constitutional law. 
Even so, there is no doubt that the false oppositions capture a 
sense prevalent in the legal academic profession that there's some-
thing different about constitutional law. Certainly we have all 
heard responses to discussions of perfectionism in constitutional 
law, or the "there's no there there" theme in critical legal studies, in 
which colleagues who teach tax or estates and trust say, "Since con-
stitutional law is your speciality, what you say must be true, but 
over here, where we do real law, none of that seems right." I want 
to develop three reactions to that sort of comment. 
The first is that, deep in my heart, I know-and I think that 
the colleagues who make the response know-that it is untrue. I 
believe, and I think that they know, that all of the moves that 
demonstrate the indeterminacy of constitutional law can be made in 
any other area of law. Part of the problem is that the "indetermi-
nacy" argument has been widely misunderstood. No one denies 
that some firm predictions can be made about how some subset of 
problems in constitutional law will come out in the foreseeable fu-
ture-the classic example being the thirty-five-year-old presidency. 
In just the same way tax lawyers can make firm predictions about 
how some subset of problems in tax law will come out. The bite of 
the indeterminacy thesis is that, just at the point when a claimant is 
backed up by some amount of political clout, at that point the 
claimant's constitutional arguments will be experienced as taking 
on enough cogency to introduce indeterminacy into an area that 
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theretofore had been thought completely settled. Perhaps we might 
take the renewed constitutional attack on rent control laws as an 
example. In the tax arena, surely it must be the case that, just at the 
point that a claimant is backed up by some amount of economic and 
political power, that claimant's arguments about how the tax law 
should be interpreted will begin to be experienced as more cogent 
than they had been. 
The second response goes to the issue of "a government of laws 
not of men (and women)." Perhaps people experience a difference 
between the mushiness of constitutional law and the hardness of 
real law because they think they accept the tenets of positivism. It 
is not so much that private law is hard and rule-like, but that it 
could be if we wanted it to be. Any time judges introduce mushi-
ness into private law, we-that is, a legislature-can eliminate the 
mushiness by adopting a new set of rules. If private law begins to 
be the product of a government of men and women, we can make it 
a government of rules. The contrast with constitutional law is obvi-
ous; there the judges are under no real constraints, and if they de-
cide that they like standards and mush because that is what 
maximizes their power, very little can be done about it. 
Yet, there are some obvious problems with this sense-it really 
doesn't amount to a thought-that the government of laws can be 
sustained in private law in a way that it cannot be sustained in con-
stitutional law. The first is that it has an unrealistic premise about 
the constraints that a system of rule-like laws places on judges. It 
may be the case that, at least for a while (a qualification necessary 
because of the first response I offered above), a single rule can con-
strain judges. But there is no such thing as a single rule. All rules 
are parts of a complex rule system, in which it is always relatively 
easy to locate a counterrule to set off against the one suggested as 
constraining the judge. Sometimes these counterrules are pejora-
tively characterized as exceptions to the main rule, but their exist-
ence is indisputable, and they loosen the constraints that the main 
rule places on the judge. 
The second problem with the sense that judges can be con-
strained in private law by legislative action is that it doesn't at all 
solve the problem of having a government of men and women 
rather than a government of laws. After all, our ordinary sense of 
legislatures is precisely that it is perfectly all right for them to be 
unprincipled and arbitrary, drawing lines simply on the basis of 
what the balance of political forces is at any particular time. To the 
extent that the arbitrariness of a mushy system of private law is 
thought to be limited by the availability of legislative revision, to 
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that extent we are counting on a government of men and women-
legislators-to constrain a different government of men and wo-
men-judges. That is hardly a solutiop. 
The third response to the expressed sense that constitutional 
law is different from private law moves away from the analytical 
points I have made so far, into the domain of intellectual history. 
Unfortunately, I don't have a good enough sense of discussions 
about the distinction between public and private law in, say, the 
1920s, to be really confident about what I am about to say. With 
that caveat, I do get the sense that the opposition between constitu-
tional law and real law is a relatively recent phenomenon. Perhaps 
like Dworkin, the Legal Realists of the early part of this century 
were probably motivated by concern about the Supreme Court's 
constitutional decisions, but their jurisprudence focused on demon-
strating the mushiness of private law. That is, they apparently did 
not experience private law as distinctively rule-like when compared 
to constitutional law. The question, then, would be when and why 
did the distinction emerge? 
In discussions of constitutional law, whenever one identifies a 
relatively recent phenomenon one attributes it to the Warren 
Court-so much so that the abortion decisions of 1973 are regularly 
characterized as really being Warren Court decisions despite the 
fact that Chief Justice Burger and two other Nixon appointees were 
in the majority. I suggest that the emergence of false oppositions 
between real law and constitutional law also has something to do 
with the Warren Court, but in a fairly complicated way. 
Here's how I would tell the story. We entered the Warren 
Court era with a complex legacy from Legal Realism. At least 
among academics, the prevalent view was that all legal decisions, 
including constitutional ones, had to be reached by a process of bal-
ancing competing interests. Justice Black purported to believe in 
rules, but, we were assured by Charles Black and Kenneth Karst, he 
really didn't mean it; it was just that pretending there were rules 
was a better way of defending civil liberties than openly balancing 
the interests. The Warren Court advanced a particular legal-polit-
ical program, fulfilling and to some degree extending the program 
of the New Deal coalition. It had done so by means of a combina-
tion of rules and interest balancing. Then, when the New Deal coa-
lition collapsed in the late 1960s, its opponents had two targets that 
had historically been intertwined: the substantive decisions of the 
Warren Court, and its characteristic methods of rules and mushy 
interest balancing. They could undermine the Warren Court's deci-
sions indirectly by arguing, first, that the Warren Court's rules were 
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vulnerable to the usual criticism of rules as being over- and under-
inclusive in terms of their purposes, and second, that mushiness is 
not real law, so that the substantive decisions weren't real law 
either. The first argument characterizes the conservative attack on 
the Warren Court's doctrines about standing and political ques-
tions-for example, as articulated in Justice Harlan's 1968 dissent 
in Flast v. Cohen and the Court's 1984 opinion in Allen v. Wright-
as well as in the erosion of the Miranda rules by the creation of 
exceptions like the public safety exception. The second argument is, 
in some ways, our topic today. (It should be obvious, incidentally, 
that the two arguments are fundamentally inconsistent. By aban-
doning a rule-like approach to standing in Allen v. Wright, the 
Court necessarily adopts a mushy standard-like approach, which 
commentators like Gene Nichol have criticized as basically 
lawless.) 
Thus, I suggest, the false opposition between constitutional law 
and real law emerged at the point when opposition to the program 
of the Warren Court became politically respectable, and was one of 
the vehicles of that opposition. There are undoubtedly other, prob-
ably deeper reasons. For example, the false opposition plainly seeks 
to give more value to real, that is, private law than to mushy, that 
is, constitutional law, and it may be that valorizing private law in 
that way is one expression of a general conservative valorization of 
the private sphere. 
If the preceding analysis is correct, I end up in the uncomforta-
ble position of thinking that perhaps I ought not to have addressed 
the topic of our meeting, because to have addressed it is to have 
accepted the intellectual credibility of the implicit claims of the false 
oppositions, which is to say, to have accepted a political program 
that I reject. 
